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Concurrent Verbal Protocol Analysis 
in Sport: Illustration of Thought Processes 
During a Golf-Putting Task
Luis Calmeiro
University of Durham
Gershon Tenenbaum
Florida State University
The purpose of this study was to examine the feasibility of concurrent verbal 
protocols to identify and map thought processes of players during a golf-putting 
task. Three novice golfers and three experienced golfers performed twenty 12-foot 
putts while thinking aloud. Verbalizations were transcribed verbatim and coded 
using an inductive method. Content analysis and event-sequence analysis were 
performed. Mapping of thought sequences indicated that experienced players’ cog-
nitive processes centered on gathering information and planning, while beginners 
focused on technical aspects. Experienced players diagnosed current performance 
aspects more often than beginners did and were more likely to use this informa-
tion to plan the next putt. These results are consistent with experienced players’ 
higher domain-specific knowledge and less reliance on step-by-step monitoring 
of motor performance than beginners. The methods used for recording, analyzing, 
and interpreting on-line thoughts of performers shed light on cognitive processes, 
which have implications for research.
Keywords: golf, verbal reports, cognitive processes, verbalizations.
A golf putt is considered a closed skill, as it has clearly defined beginning and 
end points. As a “self-paced” task, its execution is entirely controlled by the athletes 
and occurs under stable and predictable environmental conditions (Singer, 1988). 
Putting is a crucial aspect of the game of golf. If one assumes that the score of par 
requires golfers to play two putts per hole, this stroke represents 36 putts in a par 
round of 72. Improving the quality of putting may result in a significant decrease 
in golfers’ overall scores. Therefore, understanding the cognitive processes that 
take place during the execution of this skill may have important implications for 
athletes’ development. Knowledge of cognitive processes during this task can 
inform coaches and athletes and potentially expedite athletes’ development process.
Luis Calmeiro is with the School of Applied Social Sciences at the University of Durham, UK. Gershon 
Tenenbaum is with Florida State University College of Education in Tallahassee, FL.
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To capture these essential cognitive processes during competitive events, 
ecologically valid methods have been suggested. Ericsson and Simon’s (1993) 
verbal protocol method allows for the study of these processes while they are 
occurring (e.g., Nicholls & Polman, 2008). Cognitive processes can be detected 
through “thought expression” elicited through verbal protocols during task 
performance. Verbal protocols have been used to study participants’ cognitive 
processing strategies during problem solving, decision making, and judgment 
tasks in a variety of domains such as chess (e.g., Charness, 1981; Chase & 
Simon, 1973), sport (e.g., McPherson, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), music (e.g., Waters, 
Townsend, & Underwood, 1998), and aviation (e.g., Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). 
The method consists of recording verbalizations of participants’ thoughts when 
they are performing a task or after task completion. Collecting concurrent verbal 
protocols requires participants to “talk aloud” or “think aloud” as they perform a 
task. Ericsson and Simon argued that these procedures do not change participants’ 
cognitive processes because they are reported as information being processed. 
As “task-directed cognitive processes determine what information is heeded 
and verbalized” (p. 16), talk-aloud procedures minimize potential hazards of 
introspection and inferences about behavior.
Ericsson and Simon (1993) stated that difficulties with “verbalizing percep-
tual-motor processes are more visible in problem situations where the problem is 
represented physically, and performance involves manipulation of this physical 
representation” (p. 92). Verbalization of highly automatic tasks is improbable 
because the required information to perform such tasks is not available in short-term 
memory (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002). Beilock and colleagues (Beilock & 
Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2002) demonstrated an impoverished episodic recollec-
tion of putts among expert golfers (e.g., “describe the last putt you took, in enough 
detail”), which suggests that skilled putting is encoded in a procedural form that 
supports performance without the need for step-by-step attentional control. In 
highly automatic tasks, verbalizing heeded information is not likely to increase 
task complexity or to interfere with automatic processes; subjects verbalize what 
is being heeded in working memory and accessed at a conscious level. Beilock 
et al. (2003) suggested utilizing a concurrent verbal protocol to ascertain to what 
type of information athletes are attending while putting and whether this informa-
tion is consistent with findings of poor episodic recollections of experts compared 
with novices.
It has been described that skilled golfers reported greater pregame and preshot 
planning, rehearsal, and visualization than did less accomplished golfers (McCaf-
frey & Orlick, 1989). Skilled golfers have also demonstrated higher levels of con-
centration and automaticity and appear to dwell less on past mistakes and missed 
opportunities (e.g., Thomas & Over, 1994). Thus, if the information reported is 
consistent with information heeded in working memory, it is expected that, com-
pared with beginners, experienced players should report fewer details associated 
with the technical components of the skill and more details of the decision-making 
process associated with the planning of the shot.
To study thought and attention processes, Beilock and colleagues’ (Beilock 
& Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2002) used controlled environmental conditions in 
which analysis of environmental settings relevant to performance were not present 
(e.g., terrain slope, grass height). Therefore, heeded information by participants is 
Thought Processes During Golf Putting    225
likely to portray a limited representation of the entire spectrum of situational cues 
golfers have to attend to when performing on a green.
Verbal protocols in sport have been scarcely used, but in the last two decades 
there has been increased interest in this method for the study of a variety of issues, 
such as learning processes in bowling (Langley, 1995) and volleyball (Ram & 
McCullagh, 2003); congruence between actual and retrospective reports of emo-
tion (Tenenbaum & Efran, 2003; Tenenbaum, Lloyd, Pretty, & Hanin, 2002); 
tactical decisions in tennis (McPherson, 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; McPherson & 
Thomas, 1989), volleyball (McPherson & Vickers, 2004), and baseball (McPherson 
& MacMahon, 2008); and stress and coping in golf (Nicholls & Polman, 2008). 
Verbal protocols in McPherson and colleagues’ studies were used to infer players’ 
problem representations, solution processes, and domain-specialized strategies and 
to show how experts accessed complex tactical problem representations, which 
guided their encoding for critical environmental cues and retrieval of relevant and 
detailed knowledge structures from long-term memory. Experts’ superior decision 
making was linked to specific memory structure adaptations, which were termed 
“current event profiles” and “action plan profiles” (McPherson, 2000). Experts 
used more sophisticated action plans and current event profiles, while novices 
rarely planned and seemed to lack these memory structures. The more frequent use 
of current event profiles may allow experts to easily access and retrieve relevant 
information to make decisions and adjustments during competition. Pertaining to 
the golf-putting task, it is expected that skilled golfers are able to plan the shot 
more systematically and use the information of the outcome to adjust the strategy 
in approaching the subsequent shot.
The present study has two main purposes: (a) to use a concurrent verbal protocol 
approach aimed at identifying patterns of thought processes and (b) to compare 
the content and sequence of thought processes of players of varying skill levels by 
utilizing an event-sequence analysis.
Method
Participants
The sample was comprised of three experienced golfers and three beginners (N = 
6), ranging in age from 23 to 27. All participants were Caucasian university students 
who had a variety of experiences with golf. Experienced golfers were males who 
had been playing golf for 11–15 years. Participant E1 estimated having played 
75 hr of golf in the previous year, currently played twice per month, and held a 
handicap of 13. Participant E2 had been a collegiate golfer. He reported having 
played approximately 800 hr last year; currently, he plays once per month, and his 
handicap is zero. Participant E3 reported having played 60 hr last year. He currently 
plays once per week with a handicap of 18.
Beginners were three females (participants B1, B2, and B3). Participants B1 
and B2 had been playing golf for approximately two and one year, respectively. B1 
reported currently playing golf once per week and estimated having played a total of 
45 hr during the previous year. B2 reported currently playing less than once a month, 
and estimated having played 60 hr of golf during the previous year. B3 reported not 
playing golf on a regular basis. Beginners reported not having a handicap.
226  Calmeiro and Tenenbaum
Task
Participants were asked to perform a total of twenty 12-foot putts on the practice 
green of a golf course while thinking aloud. Participants were asked to verbalize 
their thoughts as they went through the several stages of putting, that is, from 
the analysis of the green until the observation of the outcome. Participants wore 
an external microphone that was attached to their shirts and plugged into a tape 
recorder to record verbalizations. Twenty golf balls were placed in groups of five, 
in four different positions around the cup. Participants were required to putt five 
times from one location and then proceed to the next location for another set of 
five putts. The four putt locations included two uphill and two downhill putts with 
breaks to the right and to the left.
Procedure
Participants were recruited by means of verbal advertisement of the study in a 
variety of classes where the purpose of the study and general procedures were 
explained. They were told that the purpose of the study was to identify what 
golfers of different caliber think about when they are putting, and what types of 
things they pay attention to when playing. The researcher agreed on a suitable 
time with each participant to run the experiment on the university practice green. 
Upon arrival, participants signed an informed consent and provided demographic 
information, such as age, gender, years of experience in playing golf, and fre-
quency of play. Next, participants were allowed a warm-up period. Warm-up 
was divided into two periods. The first period consisted of putting practice on 
the green. During this period, participants practiced a variety of putts on a dif-
ferent cup than the one used for the experiment. The second period consisted of 
verbalization practice while putting. Participants were wearing the tape recorder 
and the microphone and were prompted to keep talking. The researcher provided 
feedback concerning appropriate ways of verbalizing to avoid generalization, 
inferences, and description of actions (see Ericsson & Kirk, 2001; Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993 for details). The warm-up task was terminated when participants 
reported feeling comfortable with verbalizing.
The instructions given to participants were the following:
Please think aloud and verbalize everything that is going on in your mind as 
you perform this round of putts. Pretend that you are alone. Do not describe 
or explain what you are doing. Simply give voice to your thoughts by talking 
aloud as they appear in your mind.
Participants were further informed that throughout the task, the experimenter 
could prompt them to “keep talking.” Prompting to “keep talking” may eventu-
ally increase reactivity because participants may feel forced to conform to the 
experimenter’s expectations and report thoughts that otherwise would not rep-
resent usual thought processes. Therefore, participants were informed that this 
prompt should be understood only as a reminder to verbalize their thoughts and 
not as an obligation to report thoughts they were not having. It has been suggested 
that such an explanation reduces reactivity to verbalization (Ericsson & Kirk, 
2001).
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Data Analysis
Coding Verbal Responses and Protocol Analysis. Verbal reports were 
quantitatively analyzed according to a coding scheme developed for the current 
study. Each participant’s verbal reports were transcribed verbatim and units of 
information (UI) were classified according to the following categories: (a) gathering 
information (GI) reflected participants’ search for relevant characteristics of the 
environment (e.g., “there’s a break left,” “it is mostly uphill”); (b) planning (PL) 
referred to the definition of actions or strategies to reach a goal (e.g., “aim two cups 
right,” “hit firm at the hole”); (c) technical instruction (TI) specified technical aspects 
of the motor performance (e.g., “arms bent,” “feet are parallel”); (d) description of 
outcome (DO) reflected what had happened in terms of process or evaluation of the 
action (e.g., “[the ball] flew that by,” “it broke at the end,” “good putt”); (e) diagnosis 
(DGN) represented reasons for the observed outcome (e.g., “I didn’t hit hard 
enough,” “too firm”); (f) mental readiness (MR) refers to improving psychological 
preparation for the task (e.g., “you know you can do this,” “concentrate on this”); 
(g) reactive comments (RC) consisted of verbalizations depicting reactive comments 
to performance (e.g., “This hole is not working for me!,” “Oh, God . . . it should 
have gone in!”); and (h) other comments (OT) consisted of verbalizations that do 
not fit in any of the above categories, such as interjections (e.g., “alright,” “ok”) or 
irrelevant thoughts (e.g., “ah, ducks,” “moving my ball”).
Two judges coded verbal protocols of 15 putts from three different participants. 
Reliability was estimated by the equation, na/(na+nd) × 100, where na is the number 
of agreements and nb is the number of disagreements. The same coders also coded 
the 15 verbal protocols 7 days later to determine the range of intrarater reliability. 
Overall interrater reliability estimates for the first and second moments were 0.63 
and 0.78, respectively. Overall intrarater reliability was 0.73 to 0.85 for each judge. 
Even though there is considerable variability concerning cutoff coefficient values, 
Neuendorf (2002) stated that coefficients of 0.80 would be acceptable in most 
situations. In addition, Frey, Botan, and Kreps (2000) proposed a 70% agreement 
to be considered reliable.
To analyze thought sequences of experienced and beginning golfers, coded 
units of information in each putt were organized in a sequential manner. Absolute 
and relative frequencies for each pair of adjacent categories were calculated and 
used for comparing individuals and groups (i.e., skill level).
Discussion Analysis Tool System (DAT). Analysis of thought sequences was 
performed utilizing the Discussion Analysis Tool (DAT) system (Jeong, 2003). 
DAT is used to perform a sequential analysis in which the probabilities of a 
given event (e.g., thought) being elicited by a preceding event (e.g., thought) are 
calculated (Jeong, 2004). DAT performs an event sequence analysis by tallying 
the frequency of each thought interaction. The frequency of each target-thought 
is transformed into relative frequencies, or transitional probabilities. Transitional 
probabilities are estimates of the likelihood of a given thought (i.e., event) 
occurring or being elicited after a particular type of thought relative to all other 
types of thoughts also elicited after the first thought. In addition, DAT allows 
researchers to convert the observed transitional probabilities between thoughts into 
a transitional state diagram. This diagram is a graphic representation that supports 
the identification and analysis of patterns of event sequences. Each thought 
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category is represented by a node, which is linked to another node by directional 
arrows. These arrows represent the relative frequency of each thought interaction, 
and the arrow thickness signifies the strength of the transitional probabilities 
between thought categories (Jeong, 2004). DAT has been used in sport to study 
patterns of communication in doubles tennis (Lausic, Tenenbaum, Eccles, Jeong, 
& Johnson, 2009) and appraisals and coping patterns in trapshooting competitive 
events (Calmeiro, Tenenbaum, & Eccles, 2010).
Results
Content of Verbalizations
To study the content of verbalizations, participants’ verbal reports were transcribed 
and units of information were categorized. Figure 1 shows that experienced players 
verbalized more thoughts related to gathering information, planning, knowledge 
of results, and diagnosing than beginners. Beginning golfers verbalized more 
thoughts regarding technical instruction and mental preparation. Mann-Whitney 
tests revealed a significant difference between experienced players and beginners 
in gathering information (Z = –1.96, p = 0.05), planning (Z = –1.96, p = 0.05), 
diagnosing (Z = –1.77, p = 0.046), and description of outcome (Z = –1.96, p = 
0.05). Nonsignificant differences were noted for technical instruction (Z = –.66, p 
= 0.51), mental readiness (Z = –.66, p = 0.51), reactive comments (Z = –1.09, p = 
0.28), and others (Z = –.22, p = 0.83).
Figure 1 — Relative frequency of verbalizations (units of information) across categories 
for experienced and beginning players. GI = gathering information; PL = planning; TI = 
technical instruction; DO = description of outcome; DGN = diagnosis; MR = mental readi-
ness; RC = reactive comments; OT = other.
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Sequence of Thoughts
To analyze the sequence of thoughts, units of information for each putt were cat-
egorized and organized in sequential order. This is illustrated below for the first 
five putts (P1 through P5) of participant A1:
P1: GI; GI; PL; MR; PL; MR (Putt) DO.
P2: TI; GI; DO; PL; PL; PL; MR (Putt) DO; GI.
P3: OT; PL; TI; MR; D; O; PL; TI; PL; PL; PL (Putt) D; DO; OT; D.
P4: OT; MR; TI; MR; PL; MR; GI; PL; PL (Putt) DO.
P5: PL; MR; PL; MR (Putt).
Adjacent units of information were grouped in pairs, and frequencies for 
each pair sequence were calculated. Figure 2 shows paired-thoughts expressed in 
relative frequencies of units of information for experienced and beginning golf-
ers. Only the most frequent pairs of sequential thoughts are shown. Experienced 
players expressed more thought sequences than did beginning players pertaining 
to gathering information (GI-GI; 4.3% vs. 0.5%, respectively; Z = –2.00, p < 
.05), planning (PL-PL; 14.3% vs. 1.3%, respectively; Z = –1.53, p = 0.13), and 
gathering information preceding planning (GI-PL; 6.0% vs. 1.5% respectively; 
Z = –2.00, p < .05). Sequences of planning-related thoughts followed by mental 
readiness were more frequent among experienced players than among beginners 
(PL-MR; 4.3% vs. 2.2%, respectively; Z = –1.10, p = 0.28), and the same was 
true for technical instruction (PL-TI; 8.0% vs. 3.4%, respectively; Z = –1.10, 
Figure 2 — Relative frequency of sequential pairs of thoughts before putting for experi-
enced and beginning players. GI = gathering information; PL = planning; TI = technical 
instruction; DO = description of outcome; DGN = diagnosis; MR = mental readiness; RC 
= reactive comments; OT = other.
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p = 0.28). Beginners reported more technical instruction sequences (TI-TI; 1.7% 
vs. 21.7%, respectively; Z = –0.87, p = 0.38) and mental readiness sequences 
(MR-MR; 5.6% vs. 22.7%, respectively; Z = –-0.66, p = 0.51) than did experi-
enced players.
Figures 3a and 3b represent, respectively, experienced players’ and begin-
ners’ transitional state diagrams for analyzing patterns in thought sequences 
during putting. These diagrams were obtained through Jeong’s (2003) DAT, 
and they support the process of analysis and identification patterns of thought 
processes. Nodes represent the study’s categories, and the arrows linking these 
nodes represent the direction and strength of the interaction. Numbers in the 
transitional state diagrams represent the probability of one category being fol-
lowed by another category. For example, in experienced golfers, the probability 
of diagnosing-related thoughts being followed by planning-related thoughts is 
0.55 (i.e., DGN➝PL, 0.55); in other words, 55% of diagnosing-related thoughts 
were followed by planning-related thoughts.
Thought patterns of experienced players suggest that they engaged in assess-
ment (i.e., gathering information) and planning in the first stages of putting; 40% 
of the thoughts after initiating the putting task were categorized as gathering 
information (15%) and planning (25%). At the beginning of the putt, they also 
used information of previous results in the form of diagnosis (15%) to proceed to 
gathering of information (11%) or planning (37%). Again, once engaged in gath-
ering information-related thoughts, they spent more time in this process (31%), 
and were more likely to follow it with planning-related thoughts (38%). Once 
they devised a plan, they were more likely to engage in mental readiness (19%) 
and technical instruction (18%). However, the stroke was most often preceded 
by mental readiness (36%). Therefore, after gathering information or planning, 
experienced players were more likely to follow with technical instruction, mental 
readiness, and putt (i.e., TI➝MR➝Putt), or mental readiness and putt (i.e., 
MR➝Putt). After diagnosis, 21% of the thoughts were mental readiness-related 
(DGN-MR), which may justify the link between mental readiness and planning 
(20%); after diagnosing, experienced players engage in mental readiness to 
refocus and redefine plans.
Patterns of thought sequences of beginners were centered on technical instruc-
tion; furthermore, diagnosis was rarely used. These players started the task with 
mental readiness (29%), technical instruction (29%), or gathering information-
related thoughts (26%). Planning was mainly preceded by gathering information 
(37%), however, and was more likely to be followed by putting (31%) or technical 
instruction (34%). Contrary to experienced players, 60% of technical instruction-
related thoughts of beginners were followed by thoughts of the same category. 
Unlike experienced players, beginners did not usually return to thought processes 
associated with planning. Once they dealt with technical aspects of the task, they 
were more likely to putt (15%). Finally, diagnosing-related thoughts preceded put-
ting (50%) and mental readiness (50%); note that percentages were based on only 
two diagnosing-related thoughts.
The number of verbalizations representing thought sequences after putting was 
low. Overall, only experienced players showed a pattern of thoughts characterized 
by acknowledging results followed by a diagnose-related thought (DO-D; four 
paired thoughts representing 13.8% of all paired thoughts).
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Figure 3 — Transitional state diagrams of sequential thought processes of (a) experienced 
players, and (b) beginning players. BGN = beginning of task; GI = gathering information; 
PL = planning; TI = technical instruction; DGN = diagnosis; MR = mental readiness.
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to uncover patterns of cognitive processing used by golfers 
during a golf putt. Thought sequences of experienced and beginning players were 
compared to identify characteristic forms of problem solving that may discriminate 
between golfers of varying caliber.
Thought sequences of experienced players represent a temporal pattern of 
thoughts characterized by evaluation of putting conditions, determination of plans 
and goals, and shot execution. Consistent with findings of increased preshot plan-
ning of experts (e.g., McCaffrey & Orlick, 1989; Thomas & Over, 1994), planning 
strategy and goals appears to guide the execution stage. Self-monitoring seems to 
ensure that mental state and execution are adequate to carry out the plan or achieve 
the goal. It seems that, for experienced golfers, there is a coupling between shot 
execution and strategy/goals. Accordingly, expert tennis players have been shown 
to access and associate more varied, sophisticated, and interrelated concepts than 
novices did and to process more information pertaining to current event profiles and 
action plan profiles for developing and planning response selections (McPherson, 
2000; McPherson & Kernodle, 2003). In the current study, experienced golfers 
were more able to look for relevant information on the green and engage in more 
solutions to play the shot.
In addition, experienced players verbalized more diagnostic-related thoughts 
after the putt and followed these thoughts with planning the next putt. This pattern 
becomes more marked after the first putt of each set of five putts: after gather-
ing information for the first putt, further information gathering and planning are 
dependent on assessment needs. Conversely, beginners rarely diagnosed difficul-
ties with performance. These differences likely represent more domain-relevant 
knowledge of experienced players compared with beginners (Beilock, Wierenga, 
& Carr, 2003; McPherson & Kernodle, 2003). As argued by Singer (2000), what 
athletes think about before, during, and after an event may impact performance; 
therefore, an understanding of these thoughts patterns in experienced players may 
prove useful to coaches, athletes, and sport psychologists to develop strategies that 
facilitate optimal performance.
Beginning players more often verbalized the mechanical aspects of putt execu-
tion than experienced players. The fact that experienced golfers did not engage in 
considerable technical instruction might indicate a higher degree of automaticity of 
motor control. Novices are thought to rely on step-by-step skill execution (Anderson, 
1982; Beilock et al., 2002), during which poorly learned skills are “controlled by 
declarative knowledge that is held in short-term memory and attended step-by-step” 
(Beilock et al., 2003, p. 300). On the other hand, experienced players are thought 
to rely more on automatic processes during execution of well-learned skills, which 
are “supported by procedural knowledge that operates without the need for explicit 
or attended monitoring” (Beilock et al., 2003, p. 300).
Beilock et al. (2002) provided evidence indicating expert golfers’ generic 
descriptions of a putt consisted primarily of assessing and planning. They also 
made fewer references to putting mechanics in their episodic recollections than 
novices. Novices’ episodic recollections of skill mechanics represent higher 
allocation of attentional resources to these aspects during putt execution. These 
authors suggested that experts’ higher declarative knowledge is not used during 
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real time performance, because execution is controlled by automated procedural 
knowledge that runs outside working memory. In addition, confirming Beilock 
et al.’s contentions, thought-sequence analysis in the current study indicates that 
allocation of attention by beginners and experienced players also follows a differ-
ent pattern. Experienced players did not report as many technical aspects of the 
skill as novice players, likely because this information was not being accessed by 
working memory. It is likely that experienced golfers’ cognitive resources were 
oriented toward external cues aimed at “reading the green.”
The higher number of verbalizations concerning planning strategies and goals 
of experienced golfers compared with beginning golfers is also consistent with 
McPherson’s (2000) finding that expert tennis players generated more planning 
concepts than novices did. In line with increased gathering information among 
experienced rather than novice golfers, professional tennis players accessed more 
extensive and well-developed condition concepts during competition than novices 
(McPherson & Kernodle, 2003). Novice tennis players primarily generated concepts 
regarding execution goals, showed limited diagnosis of current game contexts, 
attended to less pertinent or inappropriate environmental features or game events, 
and planned shots less frequently.
According to McPherson and Kernodle (2003), novice tennis players gener-
ated “do-concepts” to explain why an execution failed rather than to find possible 
solutions for motor skill enhancement. Similarly, in the current study, beginning 
golfers verbalized more technical information-related thoughts to monitor their 
motor skills execution to make sure they went through all the steps, rather than to 
correct any aspect of their performance.
The transitional state diagram of the experienced players shows a pattern 
of thought processes initially revolving around assessment tasks (i.e., gathering 
information and establishing a plan), followed by preparation of shot execution 
by being technically and mentally ready; however, this preparation seems to be 
monitored by recurring thoughts of the established plan. Conversely, beginners’ 
representation of thought sequences shows that technical instructions were more 
likely to occur at the beginning of the task, and after almost any other category of 
verbalization. Moreover, sequences of technical instruction-related thoughts (i.e., 
GI-GI) were also more likely than any other thought sequence.
Experienced players demonstrated a pattern of thoughts characterized by 
acknowledging results followed by diagnosing-related thoughts. Experienced 
players described and evaluated the outcome, and diagnosed more often than 
beginners, suggesting that information concerning past performance outcomes 
is used more by experienced players to diagnose and update subsequent perfor-
mance strategies (McPherson, 2000). Although beginners demonstrated the same 
pattern of thoughts immediately after putting, frequencies were very low. Often, 
the beginners did not verbalize at all, which may represent either underdeveloped 
knowledge structures, quicker disengagement from the task, or both. The present 
data may indicate that experienced golfers have more structured thought processes 
than beginners do, representing a better balance among phases of the shot routine 
but disparate conscious effort allocated to each of the phases. This information 
may be used by coaches, athletes, or sport psychologists to improve the structure 
of preshot routines so that attentional resources are efficiently allocated to relevant 
cues in each stage of the routine.
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Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of the current study is concerned with the characteristics of the 
sample, which demands caution in the interpretation of the results. First, the small 
sample size used in the current study could explain some of the nonsignificant 
differences in this study; future research with a larger sample size must address 
this possibility. Second, even though to the best of our knowledge there is no evi-
dence indicating gender differences in verbalization ability, it is possible that the 
gender composition of both groups constitutes a confounding variable. Third, more 
variability on golfers’ levels of ability is recommended to confirm differences in 
thought patterns.
Another limitation is the low reliability of the coding scheme, which requires 
a clearer definition of categories. It appears, however, that the coding scheme rep-
resents to some degree the attentional demands required by the task, but proved to 
discriminate experienced and beginning players. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
tendencies observed are coherent and consistent with existing literature. Therefore, 
recommendations to the replication of this study include recruitment of a larger 
sample and including experts and intermediate level golfers, a more homogenous 
sample regarding gender, and a redefinition of the coding scheme. Finally, it is 
recommended to determine whether verbalizing during putting interferes with task 
outcome to ascertain utilization of concurrent verbal protocols in more ecologi-
cally valid situations.
Conclusion
The purpose of the current study was to (a) use a concurrent verbal protocol 
approach to uncover patterns of cognitive processes and (b) compare the content 
and sequence of thought processes of players of varying skill levels by utilizing 
an event-sequence analysis. The results indicate that experienced players spent 
more time than beginners did assessing the conditions and/or planning the putt. 
Experienced players had more thought sequences pertaining to gathering infor-
mation, planned strategies and goals more often, and engaged in putt execution 
while referring back to the established goals and strategies without focusing on 
mechanical aspects of the task.
These results are consistent with findings that experts display better goals, 
planning, strategy use, self-monitoring, and self-evaluation than nonexperts and 
novices (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2002; Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 
2002; McPherson & Kernodle, 2003; Thomas & Over, 1994). This information 
may be useful to coaches, athletes, and sport psychologists as it taps into thought 
sequences that can be used to identify golfers’ self-talk patterns and construct 
more efficient preshot routines associated with allocation of attentional resources 
and problem solving.
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